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This paper reviews the recent literature on cross-border banking, with a focus on policy implications. 
Cross-border banking has increased sharply in recent decades, particularly in the form of entry, and 
has affected financial systems’ development, access to financial services and stability.  Reviewing the 
empirical literature, I find much, although not uniform, evidence that cross-border banking supports 
the development of an efficient and stable financial system that offers a wide access to quality 
financial services at low cost.  However, as better financial systems have more cross-border banking, 
the relationship between cross-border banking and competitiveness has to be carefully judged. While 
developing countries have some special conditions, provided a minimum degree of oversight is in 
place, they experience effects similar to developed countries.  There are some questions, though, on 
the impacts of cross-border banking on lending based on softer information and on stability.  Relevant 
experiences from capital markets show that the degree of cross-border financial activities can affect 
local market sustainability and there can be path dependency when opening up to cross-border 
competition.  Reviewing the fast changing landscape of financial services provision, I argue that 
cross-border banking highlights the increased importance of competition policy in financial services 
provision.  This competition policy cannot be traditional, institutional based, but will need to resemble 
that used in other network industries. Furthermore, with globalization accelerating, competition policy 
will need to be global, supported by greater cross-border institutional collaboration and using the 
GATS process and the disciplines of the WTO.  GATS can be of especial value to developing 
countries as it provides a binding, pro-competition framework that has proven more difficult to 
establish otherwise. 
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Cross-border banking has long been an important part of the trend towards increased 
globalization and financial integration.  In terms of this paper, cross-border banking refers to 
both cross-border capital flows as well cross-border entry in banking.  Cross-border capital 
flows have long been important drivers of financial integration.  Particularly in the form of 
cross-border entry, cross-border banking has increased sharply in the last decade and has 
affected countries’ financial systems in many ways and dimensions.  Research has long 
studied the determinants and implications of cross-border capital flows and has started to 
analyze the determinants and cost and benefits of the recent wave of foreign entry in banking 
systems.  In particular, a growing number of papers, using cross-country, individual and 
country bank evidence, have investigated the effects of foreign bank entry on local banking 
systems.  The purpose of this paper is to review this literature, taking a broad view of cross-
border banking as well as of its competitiveness implications, but focusing on the policy 
implications of the findings.  In reviewing the literature, I focus on a number of aspects.   
 
First are the determinants of cross-border banking. These determinants are important to 
identify as they point towards the countries and circumstances under which one can expect 
cross-border banking to occur⎯or the degree to which it might occur and affect the local 
financial systems.  Many of the determinants of cross-border banking identified in the 
literature are as expected⎯countries’ creditworthiness, quality of institutional environment 
and growth opportunities.  Furthermore, there appears to be a regional or proximity bias, 
including clustering, in cross-border flows and banking.  I highlight that these factors often 
correlate with the strength of the local financial system. In other words, good financial 
systems are more likely to also have more cross-border banking.   As such, one can expect 
the determinants of cross-border banking to complicate the analysis of any competitiveness 
implications. In other words, it will be hard to separate any “implications” of cross-border 
banking on the local banking system, including its competitiveness, from the determinants of 
the strength of the local system.     
 
Second, I review the costs and benefits associated with cross-border banking.  In terms of 
impact, one can distinguish effects on the development and efficiency of the local financial 
system, on the access to financial services by firms and households, and on the stability of the 
local financial system and the overall economy.  A growing number of papers have studied 
the effects of cross-border banking on efficiency and development, access to financial 
services and stability.  I report that these studies find largely beneficial effects, although there 
are some questions regarding the impact on relationship type lending based on softer 
information, particularly in low-income countries, and on financial stability. 
 
Third, I draw some lessons from the (more recently studied) integration in international 
capital markets.  Here, the effects of integration and competition have been observed in 
several dimensions: micro-financial, e.g., lower cost of capital, higher rates of return on 
investment, more access to financing; institutional, e.g., better quality of local rules and 
enforcement thereof; and overall market development, e.g., beneficial as well as adverse 
effects on liquidity and prospects for a sustainable local market.  The lessons from capital 
markets’ financial integration and competition are relevant for cross-border banking not only 
as banking and capital markets are converging in many respects, but also as developments in 
capital markets tend to proceed faster than in banking. The capital markets’ experiences 
suggest some specific lessons for cross-border banking: competitiveness’ impacts extend   3
beyond purely financial dimensions; there can be important impacts on overall market 
development; and there may be path dependency.  
 
Fourth, I review more generally the fast changing global landscape of financial services 
provision.  As financial systems, globally and nationally, absorb new technologies and 
distribution channels, see barriers among products and between markets being rapidly 
reduced, and as consolidation in many markets progresses, much is happening to the nature of 
the competition in financial services industries.  I argue that these trends heighten the need to 
redefine competition policy broader than it has been done to date, including revisiting the 
special nature of banks.  For all markets, I argue that there is a need to go beyond purely 
institutional approaches to competition policy⎯focusing on the contestability of entry and 
exit of players in a market⎯and beyond functional approaches⎯focusing on the level 
playing field in a market for a particular financial service. Rather, the need is to assure that 
the institutional environment for financial services provision is pro-competitive, implying 
(relatively) open access to all networks used, including payments, information and key 
distribution systems.  
 
Fifth, I discuss the special circumstances of developing countries. Financial services 
industries in developing countries are undergoing changes similar to rest of the world. While 
institutional weaknesses in many developing countries are severe, they often represent deeper 
causes related to political economy factors related to the power of incumbents and associated 
with of a large public sector role.  I argue that developing countries may benefit more than 
developed countries do from committing to a pro-competitive framework since credibility is 
more at a premium, and competition policy authorities are often weaker and have greater 
difficulty in implementing effective competition policy and resolving conflicts with 
prudential authorities.   
 
Finally, I conclude with lessons for competition policy as they relate to financial services in 
general and to the role played by the WTO and regional free-trade types of arrangements. I 
argue that a horizontal approach negotiating to financial services is preferable.  Under a 
horizontal approach, no single segment is negotiated separately but rather all services (and 
goods) are considered jointly. I highlight that this also means the prudential carve-out for 
financial services may need to be revised in scope and applicability.  I also suggest that it will 
be useful to complement the forthcoming round of market access commitments in GATS 
with a set of pro-competitive principles of sound regulation.  For developing countries the 
WTO/GATS can help in committing to pro-competition, especially as it relate to the 
institutional and functional approaches. 
 
The structure of paper itself is as follows.  I first define the forms of cross-border banking 
that I want to analyze: capital flows and entry by foreign banks.  I also review what has been 
found to drive banking system integration, as (lack of) integration determines the scope for 
competitive implications.  I next review how to define and measure the competitive effects of 
cross-border banking, focusing on several dimensions: efficiency, access, and stability.  And I 
review studies on these aspects conducted so far.  As an inter-mezzo, I review whether there 
are lessons from the recent global financial integration in capital markets for the (potential) 
competitiveness effects of cross-border banking.  I then analyze the implications of broader 
trends in national and international financial markets, and particular what the changing 
competitive landscape implies for competition policy in some important dimensions. I discuss 
the special circumstances of developing countries and the role of the WTO/GATS next.   
Finally, I end with some areas of unknowns where further research can be useful.   4
 
2.   Forms of cross-border banking, determinants and scope of consequences 
 
Forms of cross-border banking. Under the GATS framework, there are four forms of cross-
border use or provision of (financial) services (Key, 2004).  The first mode is cross-border 
supply, i.e., the traditional trade in good and services, which in the context of finance means 
capital flows.  The second mode is consumption abroad, e.g., obtaining some financial 
services while traveling.  The third mode is by commercial presence, i.e., the production of a 
good or service within the country, which means the foreign establishment in a host market.  
The fourth mode is delivery by the presence of persons in host country, e.g., solicitation of 
insurance products by agents traveling to the country.  I focus on the first and third forms, 
i.e., the consumption or delivery of financial services produced by a financial institution 
located abroad or produced domestically by a foreign-owned financial institution.  In 
financial services, these two forms are the most important forms of trade in financial services. 
 
It is important to note that there are important interfaces between capital account 
liberalization and financial services liberalization, and thus between the two modes (Dobson 
and Jacquet, 1998).  Obviously, some aspects of domestic financial services provision by 
foreign banks (mode 3) will be impeded if there is little capital account freedom.  Vice-versa, 
the degree of capital account liberalization and ability to deliver financial services through 
capital flows will affect the incentives to establish local operations.  Another aspect is the 
relationship between financial services liberalization and domestic (de-)regulation.  The 
degree of domestic reform will affect the incentives of financial services providers’ ability to 
produce and market financial services.  This interface more generally relates to the issue of 
the determinants of cross-border banking.  The degree and motivation of cross-border 
banking are important to acknowledge as they determine the scope for competitiveness 
effects.  It is not just that without cross-border capital flows or entry, there will be no impact, 
but more generally the determinants condition the potential impact.   
 
Determinants of cross-border banking.  The literature has found capital flows and entry to be 
functions of the quality of countries’ institutions, economic and financial openness, political 
stability and growth opportunities (see Eichengreen, 2000, for a review of capital flow 
determinants and Clarke et al. 2003 for a review of foreign bank entry).  Financial centers 
seem to play a special role as they experience more entry relative to these factors (Buch, 
2003; Buch and DeLong, 2004; see also Focaselli and Pozzolo, 2003).  The literature has 
found capital flows to be motivated by perverse factors, e.g., moral hazard in the form of a 
safety net provided by the government (Dooley, 2000).  For entry, besides these, more 
general factors, a residual role has been found for indirect barriers, such as limits on mergers 
and acquisitions (Berger, Buch, DeLong and DeYoung, 2004).  Anecdotal evidence and 
industry studies (Financial Leaders Group 1997) show that these barriers can sometimes be 
quite subtle and raised by incumbents, as when access to the payments system is limited to 
incumbents through specific pricing or other policies (as has been argued in South Africa) or 
when there are limits on payments of interest on demand accounts (as was the case in 
France).  The general point is that the determinants condition the possible effects of cross-
border banking.  Put differently, the competitiveness effects may be limited in those countries 
most in need of increased competition, for economic or political reasons, as cross-border 
banking is limited for exactly these countries (see further Berger forthcoming). 
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Banking integration. While we would like to know the degree of effective financial 
integration as an input into any competitiveness study, in practice the degree of integration is 
hard to measure, even for developed countries where data are better than for many 
developing countries.  When measured, it is typically done imperfectly using prices (e.g., 
interest rates) and quantities (e.g., actual capital flows or entry).  Among developed countries 
that otherwise face limited barriers and otherwise well functioning institutions, such the EU, 
integration has been found to be high in wholesale banking and certain areas of corporate 
finance, modest in relationship, and low in retail banking (CEPR, 2005).  For example, 
Dermine (forthcoming) shows that in terms of quantities, cross-border banking penetration in 
the EU has been the least in retail banking. In terms of prices, differences in spreads have 
been found to be the lowest in corporate banking and the highest in retail markets (ECB, 
2005; see also Baele et al. 2004). For the most part, integration has thus been the highest 
where theory predicts, even when some barriers to integration remain.  The competitiveness 
effects have been correspondingly, at least at face value, i.e., less in naturally more 
“segmented” markets, such as retail and relationship lending. Note that one needs to add “at 
face value” since theory suggests⎯and empirics show it is difficult to determine the 
competitiveness of some financial markets. 
 
Consistent with their weaker economic fundamentals and institutions, the degree of banking 
integration for developing countries is more limited.  The competitive impact of capital flows 
is often (further) limited to a subset of borrowers⎯highly rated corporations, financial 
institutions, possibly connected to government or political powers⎯and a subset of 
depositors and lenders (e.g., capital flight) as typically only those have international access 
(Claessens and Perotti, 2005). For banking entry in developing countries, though, competitive 
effects possibly cover a much wider spectrum of borrowers, lenders and others, as entry can 
be large (50% or more of market share is not uncommon in emerging markets; see Hohl and 
Remolona, forthcoming and Levy-Yeyati and Micco 2003).  At the same time, the economic 
environments in developing countries are not always stable and financial and corporate sector 
reform processes are often underway or incomplete.  This means the entry impact effects can 
be harder to discern from other factors, e.g., are the changes due to increases in competition, 
changes in governance, regulatory and supervisory improvements, or other reforms?  
 
Possible competitive effects. What types of effects can one distinguish?  I consider three 
dimensions: development and efficiency, access, and stability.  Under the first, development 
and efficiency, I consider questions like: is the system more developed, e.g., is it larger, does 
it provide better quality financial products/services; is it more efficient, i.e., exhibit a lower 
cost of financial intermediation, is it less profitable; and  is it closer to some competitive 
benchmark?  Under access, I consider whether access to financing, particularly by smaller 
firms and poorer individuals, but also in general for households, large firms and other agents 
is improved, in terms of volume and costs.  And in terms of stability, I consider whether the 
banking system has less instability, fewer financial crises and is generally more robust and its 
financial integrity higher.  I look at all these dimensions as they can be important 
relationships among them, making analyzing any individually not complete. 
 
Theory. It is useful to consider what to expect given theory on some of these 
dimensions. First, the general competition and contestability theory suggests that the market 
structure and the actual degree of entry or exit are not the most important factors in 
determining competition. The degree of contestability, rather than actual entry, matters for 
competitiveness (Baumol, Panzar, and Willig, 1982).  Furthermore, competition can be 
expected to affect several dimensions: not only efficiency and costs, but also the incentives of   6
institutions and markets to innovate.  Financial sector specific theory on competition effects 
adds to this some additional considerations (see Claessens and Laeven, 2005 for a review).  It 
has been found that the structure of systems can matter, but in many ways, including the 
ownership of the entrants and incumbents, the size and the degree of financial 
conglomeration (that is, the mixture of banking and other forms of financial services, such as 
insurance and investment banking).  It has also analyzed how access depends on the franchise 
value of financial institutions and how the general degree of competition can negatively or 
positively affect access.  With too much competition, for example, banks may be less inclined 
to invest in relationship lending (Rajan, 1992). Because of hold-up problems, however, too 
little competition may tie borrowers too much to an individual institution, making the 
borrower less willing to enter a relationship (Petersen and Rajan, 1995 and Boot and Thakor, 
2000).   
 
The quality of information interacts with the size and structure of the banking system.  There 
is evidence, for example, for the U.S. that consolidation has led to a greater distance and 
thereby to less lending to more opaque SMEs (Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein, 
2005; see also Carow, Kane and Marayaman 2004, Karceski, Ongena and Smith 2005, 
Sapienza 2002, Degryse and, Masschelein and Mitchell, 2005).  The fact that too much 
competition can undermine stability and lead to financial crises has been often argued (Allen 
and Gale, 2004 review), although difficult to document systematically (see Beck, Dermirguc-
Kunt and Levine, 2002).  These complex relationships and tradeoffs among competition, 
financial system performance, access to financing, stability, and finally growth already make 
it clear that it is not sufficient to analyze a narrow concept of competitiveness alone.  
 
The theory on the effects of competition in financial services has shown some further 
complications.  Some have highlighted that competition is partly endogenous as financial 
institutions invest in technology and relationships (e.g., Hauswald and Marguez, 2004).  This 
in turns means there are often ambiguous effects of technological innovations, access to 
information, and the dynamic pattern of entry and exit on competition, access, stability and 
efficiency (e.g., Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004, Hauswald and Marquez, 2003 and 
Marquez, 2002).  The effects are further complicated by the fact that network effects exist in 
many supply, demand or distribution aspects.  As for other network industries, this is making 
competition more complex (Claessens, Dobos, Klingebiel and Laeven, 2003).  Importantly, 
financial services industries are continuously changing⎯due to removal of barriers, 
globalization, increased role of non-bank financial institutions, technological progress and 
increased importance of networks, which is affecting the degree and type of competition, 
something I will analyze further below in section 3.    
 
Empirics. Although theory alone is giving mixed insights into the effects of cross-border 
banking on competition, the empirical findings are fairly clear.  In terms of development and 
efficiency, competition through cross-border capital flows has led to lower cost of capital for 
borrowers, higher rates of return for lenders, i.e., lower margins and lower costs of financial 
intermediation (Agénor, 2001, Bekaert and Harvey, 2003), spuring growth (Bekaert, Harvery 
and Lundblad, 2005).  Interestingly, there is some evidence that foreign banks’ international 
activities are not necessarily more profitable.  (DeYoung and Nolle, 1996 and Chang, Hasan 
and Hunter, 1998), involving possibly some cross-subsidies (as has been noted for Japanese 
banks; see Hasan and Hunter, 1996 and Peek, Rosengren and Kasirye 1999) or evidence that 
diversification benefits of international activities make lower profitability still attractive 
(Berger, DeYoung, Genay and Udell, 2000).   The effects of cross-border capital flows on 
access are found to be positive as well, although as noted increased access has largely been   7
for selected groups of borrowers.  Finally, the effects on stability of international capital 
flows have generally been found to be favorable⎯as international financial integration 
allows for greater international specialization and diversification (e.g., Obstfeld, 1998).  Of 
course, international capital flows can add to financial risks, among others, through contagion 
(Dornbusch, Park and Claessens, 2000 and Claessens and Forbes, 2001).  
 
The entry of foreign banks has generally had favorable effects on the development and 
efficiency of domestic, host banking systems (Micco, Panizza and Yanez, 2004; Mian, 2003).  
These generally positive results have occurred through various channels.  Lower costs of 
financial intermediation (measured in the forms of margins, spreads, overheads) and lower 
profitability have generally been documented (see Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga, 
2001 and follow-up studies, e.g., Berger, Clarke, Cull, Klapper and Udell, 2005).  Also, 
researchers have found some evidence of a better quality of financial intermediation, e.g., as 
one observes less loan-loss provisioning with more foreign entry beneficial (Martinez-Peria 
and Mody, 2004). The qualitative aspects have by nature been harder to document, but have 
possibly been most important.  These include the emergence of new, more diverse products, 
the greater use of technologies, and the spillovers of know-how (e.g., as people learn new 
skills in foreign banks and migrate over time to the local banks).  An additional channel has 
been pressures of foreign banks to improve regulation and supervision, increase transparency, 
etc., and more generally be a catalyst for reform (see further Levine 1996 and Dobson, 2005, 
for reviews). 
 
The effects of the entry of foreign banks on development and efficiency appear to depend, 
though, on some conditions.  The general development and any remaining barriers can hinder 
the effectiveness of foreign banks (Garcia-Herrero and Martinez Peria, 2005; Demirguc-
Kunt, Laeven and Levine, 2004).  Also, the relative size of foreign banks’ entry seems to 
matter.  With more limited entry (as a share of the total host banking system), fewer 
spillovers seem to arise, suggesting some threshold effect (Claessens and Lee, 2003).  In 
terms of individual foreign bank characteristics, it seems that larger banks are associated with 
greater effects on access for SMEs, perhaps as they are more committed to the market, while 
smaller banks are more niche players (Clarke et al. 2005).   The health of both the home 
banks as well as the local host bank matters, with the healthier banks showing better credit 
growth (Dages Goldberg and Kinney, 2000; see also Haber and Musacchio, 2005 and de 
Haas and van Lelyveld, 2005). 
 
It should be noted that these effects of the entry of foreign banks are not necessarily 
competitiveness effects since the studies reviewed so far are not tests of formal competition 
models.  Fully specified empirical competitiveness studies are scarce, with mostly single 
country studies, but only a few cross-country studies (Berger, forthcoming reviews).  To the 
extent available, however, cross-country evidence using formal empirical contestability tests 
suggests that foreign bank ownership is the most consistent factor associated with improved 
competitiveness of local banking systems (Claessens and Laeven, 2004).  Next in importance 
are less severe entry and activity restrictions on banks.  This same study suggests that there is 
little evidence that the structure of banking system matters in terms of competitiveness.  Bank 
concentration and competitiveness are actually sometimes positively correlated, i.e., more 
concentrated banking systems exhibit more competitive behavior and the number of banks is 
never positively, and sometimes even negatively related to measures of competitiveness, i.e., 
more banks make for less competition.  This confirms the importance of contestable system 
rather than a certain structure. 
   8
The effects on access by foreign banks can be separated in terms of access to foreign capital 
and access to domestic financing.  Access to international financing is surely enhanced for 
some borrowers and lenders.  Indeed, evidence suggests that both in normal times, but 
especially during time of crises, borrowers have enhanced access to finance with more 
foreign banks present (Goldberg, 2002).  In terms of access to domestic capital, maybe in part 
since this is being more recently studied, the findings are not as clear. Generally, though, it 
has been found that access is enhanced by direct provision by foreign banks and indirectly by 
putting pressure on local banks (e.g., more competition and stability driving local banks to 
provide more access).  It has been found, for example, that firms report financing obstacles to 
be lower with more foreign banks, that even small and medium enterprises (SMEs) benefit 
and no evidence has been found that these SMEs are harmed by the presence of foreign banks 
(Clarke et al. 2001 see also Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2004).  There is some 
evidence to the contrary though. Detragiache, Gupta and Tressel (2005) for example, find that 
foreign banks presence in low-income countries leads to a reduction in credit and higher 
operating costs.  
 
Foreign banks seem to lead to more entrepreneurial activity, although the effects are lesser 
for smaller firms.  Interesting, more “connected” firms, i.e., those having access based on 
non-economic factors, seem to suffer in access from foreign banks, which would be a positive 
effect (Giannetti and Ongena, 2005). Two aspects are not yet well known: whether the effects 
come about in a mostly direct or indirect way; and whether entry is less beneficial in softer-
information lending as foreign banks may rely more on hard information to do their lending 
(see Berger, Klapper and Udell, 2001 for some evidence).  These aspects are still to be 
investigated further. 
 
Finally, the effects of entry of foreign banks on stability are generally found to be positive.  
There appears to be less risks of financial crises, and banks, foreign as well as domestic, 
display higher provisioning, less non-performing loans, suggesting better quality lending 
(Demirguc-Kunt, Min and Levine, 1998 and Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2001). There is also 
evidence of less pro-cyclical lending behavior of the local operations of foreign banks 
relative to the cross-border operations of foreign banks (Goldberg, 2005) and lower 
sensitivity to the risk of financial contagion (Goldberg, 2002).  There are, however, some 
possible negative effects.  These include negative effects on franchise value, although often 
hard to determine given recent entry in many markets (Boyd, DeNicolo, and Smith, 
forthcoming).  There can also be the risk of undiversified home countries (Buch, Carstensen 
and Schertler, 2005), which have to be weighted against the risk of an undiversified banking 
system without entry.  Then there is the risk of new technologies and new financial 
instruments being introduced pre-maturely.  Again, these risks may arise in principle, but are 
hard to quantify.  Finally, there is the risk of easier capital flows, possibly capital flight, as a 
consequence of banks that have greater access to international financial markets.  And there 
are the risks to the home countries (Cetorelli and Golberg forthcoming).   
  
Much of these empirical findings on cross-border banking have to be qualified by the fact 
that, even without formal barriers, financial integration remains imperfect.  One observes that 
even in fully integrated markets, such as the U.S. or increasingly so the EU, that there still is 
a familiarity bias in capital flows and entry decisions, e.g., more investment and entry closer 
to home.  This means that the competitiveness effects can remain limited to some markets, 
regions or market segments (Mian, forthcoming).  Of course, any further removal of barriers 
may still facilitate entry.  While evidence of immiserizing effects of foreign banks entry in 
the presence of distortions is limited, many observers (e.g., CEPR, 2005) and market   9
participants have argued that achieving the full gains from entry requires more (minimal) 
harmonization of regulations, legal and other institutional infrastructure.  
 
Furthermore, it is important to consider the interactions between capital account 
liberalization, financial services liberalization and domestic deregulation.  Generally, 
liberalizing along all three dimensions, is considered mutually reinforcing.  There are, 
however, issues of consistency and coherence between the three forms of liberalization to 
consider.   Financial services liberalization can require some degree of capital account 
liberalization as foreign banks need access to international financial markets to operate 
effectively.  Domestic deregulation and capital account liberalization can both involve the 
removal of lending restrictions, which needs to be done in a consistent fashion across the two 
forms. Inconsistencies, for example, when firms are allowed to access certain forms of 
international capital freely, while still being restricted in their borrowing domestically, can 
lead to the buildup of external vulnerabilities.  
 
Cross-border banking through capital flows and through entry can be alternative to reach a 
market (Buch and Lipppner, 2004) and tradeoffs can arise.  Using data from Italian, Spanish 
and US banks, Garcia-Herrero and Martinez Peria (2005) found that foreign banks open 
branches in countries with better profit opportunities and greater “banking freedom,” that is, 
countries that do not impose restrictions on bank activities, controls on foreign currency 
lending or high taxes on banking.  In smaller, less secure developing markets, though, banks 
rely more on cross border lending. There is also some evidence that stock markets 
liberalization before financial services liberalization increases the benefits of foreign banks, 
but that capital account liberalization first reduces the benefits (Bayrakta and Yang. 2004 see 
also Claessens and Glaessner, 1999).   
 
Lessons from capital markets. A short intermezzo useful here concerns the lessons from 
capital markets’ integration for cross-border banking.  Capital markets, both equity and bond 
markets, have for long time experienced much cross-border financial flows and in the recent 
decades have also seen more services being consumed cross-border (for example, in the form 
of the listing and trading of securities at international exchanges).  And there has been some 
foreign entry in capital markets in the last few years.  Capital markets integration is not the 
main topic here, but still can provide some useful lessons for three reasons.  One, for a 
number of reasons, including easier adoption of technology, capital markets are evolving 
faster than banking markets are.  As such, one may learn from capital markets for changes 
coming to banking markets.  Second, and more debatable, capital markets are less subject 
today to natural and policy barriers than banking markets are.  The traded nature of assets and 
the lesser importance of soft information, for example, make cross-border trading in 
securities easier than in banking products. Financial integration in capital markets is then 
often also deeper than in cross-border banking.  And third, there has been some convergence 
of banking to capital markets in terms of products and approaches, as, for example, in the 
form of credit derivatives. 
 
While there are many similarities between capital markets and cross-border banking, there 
are some important differences.  Not only are barriers (institutional and technological) less in 
capital markets than in banking, integration appears to a lesser degree than for banking 
markets a function of the quality of institutional environment.  One has, for example, seen 
near complete price integration in the capital markets of some more developed emerging 
markets, while cross-border banking flows still remain limited for the same countries.  There 
are also more distinct scale effects in capital markets, more so than in banking, with small   10
scale hindering the development of the local markets and encouraging internationalization of 
financial services (Claessens, Klingebiel and Schmukler, 2005).  Most importantly, the 
implications of financial integration in capital markets are experienced not only in supply and 
demand dimensions but also in institutional aspects.  In international capital markets, as for 
cross-border banking, suppliers and demanders benefit from a lower cost of capital, lower 
trading costs, more liquidity, higher returns, greater quantity of external financing, etc. In 
equity markets, however, there is also evidence that the institutional environment is affected 
as a consequence of competition.  Generally, the local institutional environment improves, 
i.e., when faced with competition, countries engage in a race to the top more likely than to the 
bottom (Coffee, 1999). In terms of impact on overall market development and prospects, 
however, it appears that local liquidity declines, not just for stocks listed and traded abroad, 
but also for the local-only stocks (Levine and Schmukler, 2003).  Competition can thus have 
some negative effects on the overall development of local capital markets.   
 
The lessons from capital markets for cross-border banking would be that competition effects 
can be broad.  Competition can affect efficiency and access, but also the evolution of rules 
and institutions.  Furthermore, competition can even affect the presence of markets.  Since 
scale effects appear important in capital markets, small local markets may be at risk from 
competition, including through negatively affecting the scope for the development of local 
services supporting capital markets (e.g., accounting and investment banking services).  As 
such there can also be path dependency, e.g., the development of local markets prior to 
introducing competition might provide greater scope for ending up with functioning local 
markets.  Arguments for infant industries are very tricky, though, given political economy 
factors, and as such may not provide the desired results. 
 
 
3.  Changing competitive landscape 
 
So far, I have analyzed the forces that drive cross-border banking and the impact cross-border 
banking can have on domestic banking markets.  While I have highlighted that many of the 
impacts of cross-border banking are similar to those usually subscribed to increased 
competition, there are some important differences, particularly in turns of access, stability 
and market development.  This analysis was, however, largely still within the paradigm of the 
typical goods markets and a relatively stable global financial system.  But competition in the 
financial sector can be very different from that in other goods or services markets.   
Furthermore, financial services industries are in flux and the nature of competition is 
changing as a consequence. This has implications not only for the nature of competition, but 
also for competition policy.  In this section, I will analyze the basic difficulties with applying 
competition policy in finance as well as the forces for change in financial services industries 
today, ending up with some suggestions on how competition policy might need to be adapted. 
 
Competition in finance. Competition policy in financial services provision is complex (see 
Vives 2001 for a review). The presence of large sunk costs and high fixed costs in the 
production of financial services mean significant first mover and scale advantages, possibly 
leading to natural monopoly and market power.  Large switching costs mean that customers 
do not easily change financial services providers and make the adoption of new technologies 
exhibit critical mass properties.  Financial services provision also involves the use of a great 
number of networks, such as payments, distribution and information systems.  This means 
barriers to entry can arise due to a lack of access to essential services. More general, network 
externalities can complicate the application of competition policy.  Finally, the “special   11
nature” of financial sector, with its emphasis on financial stability has always meant that 
competition policy was considered more complicated. “Free entry”, for example, even when 
subject to fitness test, has generally been considered to pose risks to financial stability as it 
would undermine franchise value.  While arguably these arguments are less relevant 
today⎯as many financial services can be provided by non-bank financial institutions and the 
role of banks as liquidity providers is less crucial today⎯it still affects the application of 
competition policy in finance in practice.  
 
In addition to these complications, recent trends have made competition, and competition 
policy, more complex (see Claessens, Dobos, Klingebiel and Laeven, 2003 for a review).  For 
one, market and product definitions have become (more) difficult.  It is trite, but nevertheless 
very important from a competition policy point of view to state that financial markets today 
are global in nature, making any application of competition policy to national markets of 
lesser value than two decades ago.  Second, markets are rapidly consolidating around the 
world (Berger, Demsetz and Strahan, 1999).   
 
In addition, the definition of a specific financial service and its market has become more 
complicated, affecting competition policy.  Today, for example, there are little differences 
between the market for pension and that for assets management services.  And with many 
non-financial institutions providing (near) banking and other financial services, the boundary 
between non-bank financial institutions and banks has become blurred.  More generally, the 
production of financial services has changed in many ways, with large investments in 
information technology and brand name necessary to operate effectively and to gain scale.  
There are also some forces towards vertical integration in some aspects, especially in capital 
markets (e.g., integration of trading systems with clearing and settlement), while other forces 
push towards more separation (e.g., clarity in functions) or horizontal consolidation (e.g., 
economies of scale). In addition, there are increasing links between banking and commerce 
(e.g., between banking and telecommunications).  
 
Revisit competition policy. These changes point to a need to revisit competition policy in the 
financial sector.  I suggest that the “new” competition policy combines three approaches: an 
institutional approach, to assure contestable markets by entry/exit of institutions, domestic 
and cross-border; a functional approach, to assure contestable markets by leveling the playing 
field across similar financial products (in all dimensions); and a production approach, to 
assure efficiently provided and equally accessible and affordable network services 
(information, distribution, settlement, clearing, payment, etc.) and to take into account any 
network externalities.  Combined, these approaches can make competition policy resemble 
that in other network industries, e.g., telecoms.  So far, however, only the institutional and 
somewhat the functional approaches have been used. I will next expand on these three 
approaches (see further Claessens 2003 for more detail). 
 
Institutional approach.  The institutional approach to competition means that the entry and 
exit regime for different type of financial institutions should be pro-competitive, or at least as 
contestable as possible after considering issues arising from financial stability. As in other 
sectors, applying the institutional approach in the financial sector involves, among others, a 
review of entry and exit barriers for a market at a regional, country, or,  global level; a review 
of actual entry and exit decisions, mergers and acquisitions of financial institutions; and 
investigations of market power and dominance of institutions.  As noted above, this approach 
is generally accepted, but is nevertheless not always used, especially not at the global level. 
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Functional approach. The functional approach uses the same concept of contestable 
markets, except it applies it to a specific service, rather than to a set of financial institutions. 
The functional approach implies a need to level the playing field for each financial service 
and between similar types of financial services across all types of providers.  It means a 
proper entry and exit regime for each financial service and avoiding differences in the 
regulatory treatment of similar types of financial services.  Few countries have adopted this 
approach. And even when tried in earnest, the principle of a level-playing field across 
functions is difficult to put in practice.  One reason is that the substitutability between 
specific financial services can be high in most dimensions, but involve subtle differences in 
some dimensions, such as credit risks or access to the safety net.  Whether remaining 
differences are distortionary will often be very difficult to establish.  Furthermore, historical 
differences can be difficult to correct as many other aspects come into play.
1   
 
Even when distortions in treatment across products have been minimized, however, it will be 
difficult to assess whether markets for specific financial products are fully competitive or 
contestable.  One reason is that financial institutions typically bundle financial services 
together and/or cross-subsidize services.  This can be because financial institutions derive 
their comparative advantage from the bundle of services they provide, rather than from any 
specific individual service.  But, it may also be because regulatory or other advantages (e.g., 
access to a distribution network) allow the financial institution to provide the bundle of 
services in a way more advantageous than a single service provider can. Open entry in one 
market segment may as a consequence not guarantee a competitive market for each specific 
product.  Or it can be that predatory cross-subsidization in the presence of natural entry 
barriers gives existing institutions an unfair advantage, allowing them to build up a market 
share.  More generally, given the network properties analyzed, it is difficult to ascertain that 
there are no anti-competitive barriers remaining. It is therefore necessary to go beyond the 
institutional and functional approaches with a more production-based approach to 
competition policy. 
 
Production approach. The production approach would mean that the various inputs, 
including network services, required for the production and distribution of financial services 
need to be available to all interested in using them, be fairly and uniformly priced and 
efficiently provided.  For no part of a specific financial service production and distribution 
chain, should there be any undue barriers or unfair pricing.  For most inputs (labor, services, 
etc.), this in turn simply requires competitive supply markets. Since the production and 
distribution of financial services rely much on common infrastructure with network 
properties, however, this approach requires more. Specifically, it requires an “efficient” 
market infrastructure, which itself is not an easily defined concept, in part as many elements 
of financial infrastructure have been subject to changes recently. 
 
The market infrastructure for financial services involves many parts, such as trading systems, 
payment and clearing systems, ATM systems, and information systems. Differences are 
many, but competition issues can arise from differences in access, ownership⎯public versus 
                                                 
1 Even when attempts have been made to level the playing field for financial service providers and across 
financial services, regulatory and other differences may continue to create barriers to full competition.   
Standards may conflict, for example, such as the need to require capital for local branches of foreign banks, but 
not for branches of domestic banks.  Information requirements may differ by product, e.g., although otherwise 
similar, securities markets products may require more information disclosure than pension products. Differences 
in the tax treatment between pension and other forms of savings can be large, although they are in many ways 
equivalent financial instruments.   13
private ownership⎯and forms of control, oversight, and corporate governance.  The 
commonly shared infrastructure of a payments system, for example, can be run by a central 
bank, by banks themselves, or by a third party.  Choices further vary between for-profit and 
not-for-profit organizations, and related, mutual and demutualized structures.  Stock 
exchanges, for example, can be organized as mutual, not-for-profit organizations or as for-
profit corporations.  The various oversight structures⎯self-regulatory, government or purely 
private arrangements⎯can vary, by explicit design or historical consequences.  
 
Each of these differences can give rise to its own set of competition policy issues.  Private 
ownership of the market infrastructure may lead to direct forms of rent-seeking by the 
owners. Self regulation of a market may lead to rules that favor insiders.  Competition is, 
however, only one of the dimensions according to which one can evaluate the various 
arrangements for the provision of market infrastructure services and the recent changes. 
Dimensions such as the efficiency of providing relevant (supportive) services, risk 
management, integrity, incentives to innovate and upgrade, are often equally or more 
relevant. The general assessment is that the trend toward demutualization and privatization of 
stock markets, for example, has led to efficiency gains in the delivery of these services, 
without necessarily compromising (and often even enhancing) the objectives of proper risk 
management, integrity, and stability.  But whether the recent changes are also always pro-
competitive is not clear, at least not as of yet, as little time has passed and research been very 
limited.  Similar lack of clarity exists with respect to competition implications of the new 
alternative trading systems for stocks and other financial assets.  More generally, the type of 
competition policies applicable to the market structure supporting forms of financial services 
is not yet clear. 
 
 
4.  The special issues of developing countries  
 
In many ways, financial services industries in all countries have been subject to similar 
trends.  Despite differences among countries—including factors such as the state of the 
financial system, readiness of the telecommunications infrastructure and the quality of the 
regulatory framework—there is much commonality and convergence in the way financial 
services industries are being reshaped.  In securities markets, global trading is becoming the 
norm.  Increased connectivity has accelerated the migration of securities trading and capital 
raising from emerging markets to a few global financial centers.  In banking, consolidation is 
proceeding in many markets and integrated financial service provision has become the norm 
around the world. 
 
Despite similarities in the evolution of financial services industries around the world, there 
remain large differences among countries in terms of overall development, the stages of their 
financial sector development, and the quality of their institutional frameworks.  This raises 
the question whether there is a need to approach the issues of cross-border banking and 
competition policy differently by level of development.   
 
For a variety of reasons, countries are at different level of development of their regulatory 
and supervisory capacity, quality of legal and judicial systems, and other institutional 
dimensions.  Reaping the full gains of cross-border banking can require a certain minimum 
level of financial sector regulation and supervision. Many of developing countries’ 
deficiencies are being identified in the assessment of compliance with international standards. 
Deficiencies in each of these areas are expected to be addressed over time in the follow-up   14
and through general pressures associated with this process (such as through disclosure of 
deficiencies and pressures from peers and investors).  
 
These reforms will take time.  Furthermore, one has to acknowledge that there will often be 
deeper reasons why failures in regulation and supervision do not allow developing countries 
to reap the full benefits of their liberalization efforts. In particular, the failure of countries to 
take appropriate regulatory actions when liberalizing often relates to political economy 
reasons, involving often moral hazard and (too) extensive forms of deposit insurance.  To 
change this will require achieving greater political openness itself a gradual process in many 
cases (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2005). Nevertheless, one should consider how reforms in 
cross-border banking could help overcome some of these political economy constraints.   
Entry by foreign financial institutions will often bring with it not only foreign expertise, but 
can also reduce political pressures on the supervisory system.  Similarly, broadening the 
scope of institutions able to provide financial services can reduce the political influence of 
incumbent banks. 
 
Beyond the need for a consistent approach in the three forms of liberalization and the need to 
deal with political economy factors, arguably there are no fixed preconditions to allow 
effective internationalization of financial services.  Countries with weak and strong regulation 
and supervision can both do well under large foreign entry; in the first case, foreign entry 
brings with it improved regulation and supervision, enhancing the quality of the overall 
domestic sector; in the second case, strong domestic regulation and supervision assure that 
entry does not lead to any concerns.  It may be that the intermediate cases of moderately 
developed frameworks present the most risks as foreign financial institutions compete away 
franchise value of incumbents, thus creating incentives for imprudent behavior, and as 
domestic and foreign investors misjudge the stability of the system and the robustness of the 
regulatory response.  In such cases, good closure rules for weak financial institutions and 
quantitative restrictions on financial exposures may be the most appropriate response while 
liberalizing.   
 
Country conditions surely have relevance, however, for the way in which competition policy, 
including the disciplines associated with GATS/WTO, is conducted.  In spite of reforms, 
many developing countries’ financial sectors are still characterized by a lack of "effective" 
competition.  They may have a quite concentrated market structure, extensive links between 
financial institutions and corporations, and a high ultimate ownership concentration of the 
financial sector.  While in principle many developing countries are open today, entry by 
foreign financial institutions may be limited to some niche areas, in part because of country 
risk perceptions.  Important, incumbent financial institutions may have a lock on networks 
essential for financial services provision.  Existing incumbents may block new initiatives via 
a variety of means.  The net results will be less pressure to reduce costs, to improve the 
quality of financial services and to move down the credit scale into lower-income retail and 
small-enterprise lending. 
 
While again it is difficult to generalize on how competition policy ought to be differentiated 
by level of development, it is likely more important for developing countries to include 
competition issues when designing reforms including changes to the payments system, credit 
information arrangements, and telecom regulatory and legal frameworks.  Specifically, one 
needs to be careful in the design of networks, whether they involve financial service specific 
systems only or are telecom related as these can become important barriers to entry, including 
for foreign banks.  In the area of retail payments, for example, the use of a third party   15
provider (not a consortium of banks) for the provision of different forms of retail payment 
services could be more appropriate from a competition point of view when the market 
structure is very concentrated.  
 
An effective competition commission is critical, but that will require adequate support, 
jurisdiction and backing vis-à-vis other supervisory agencies.  In case of many developing 
countries, the overall capacity and independence of competition authorities is limited and 
proper enforcement tools are missing. Often, political support will be lacking and conflicts 
may exist between the competition policy agency and the agency that deals with prudential 
regulation.    Also, a case for more restrictions on cross-holdings can be made, particularly in 
smaller developing countries.  Limits on groups and banking-commerce may be necessary to 
assure effective competition.   
 
 
5.  The role of GATS and WTO 
 
The GATS can be an important force for a more pro-competition policy in financial services.  
The past financial services negotiations, however, have been arduous and extended (Sorsa, 
1997).  Final success has arguably been relatively limited as many countries have 
commitments that are much less binding than their existing practices.  In others words, most 
countries have not used the process to bind themselves to an (accelerated) process of 
liberalization. In part, this outcome has arisen because the approach to date for financial 
services has been sector-specific and largely outside the normal GATS-negotiations (Kono et 
al 1997 and Key, 2004). 
 
Going forward, similar to other goods and services, a horizontal approach is preferable for 
financial services given the increased inputs from other sectors in the production and 
distribution of financial services, including those from networks industries such as 
telecommunications.  Liberalizing financial services industries alone may not lead to the full 
possible gains if other sectors do not liberalize equally. A horizontal approach is also more 
feasible today as financial services have become less special and the horizontal approach is 
thus less likely to lead to conflicts with prudential concerns.  A key argument for a horizontal 
approach, however, is that political economy factors, that are so prevalent in financial 
services, have dominated the negotiation outcome.  When there was no ability to tradeoff 
interests with those in other sectors, the political powers led to a limited liberalization.  As 
financial services are increasingly being recognized as essential inputs in overall economic 
production, the support from other sectors for efficient financial services provision, and 
consequently for liberalization, has increased, making a horizontal approach more attractive.  
 
Applying the horizontal approach to financial services liberalization may require a revisiting 
of the prudential carve-out of GATS (Sauve, 2002).  The carve-out has already been used as 
an argument to keep financial services out of the Uruguay Round negotiations. There are 
some issues as to the interpretation of the scope of the carve-out.  Under some interpretations, 
the carve-out cannot be used to evade other GATS commitments and needs to be aimed 
primarily at prudential regulation.  Even with this strict interpretation, however, the issue 
remains what constitutes justifiable prudential regulation.  On one hand, a more standard 
view on prudential regulation has developed through, among others, the promulgation of 
international banking and other standards, thus reducing the likelihood of differences in 
frameworks leading to non-trade barriers.  At the same time, there may be a need to rethink 
prudential regulation given changes in the financial services industries globally.  As noted, in   16
many countries regulation has stifled competition and countries political economy may mean 
that more rules will encourage this behavior. The current emphasis on global standards, as 
part of the new international financial architecture, implies that there are legitimate concerns 
that the approach will overshoot in concerns for safety, soundness and stability at the expense 
of concerns over free trade in financial services. 
 
The potential anti-competitive way in which the prudential carve-out can be applied does not 
imply that it needs to be removed fully.  For one, it is likely to be used sparingly.  Countries 
realize the reputation costs of invoking the carve-out and applying prudential regulation in an 
anti-competitive way. Particularly in the context of developing countries, investors will look 
for signs of credibility and invoking the carve-out will provide the opposite signal, especially 
when in a financial crisis.  It is also unclear what type of regulations can reduce risks of 
financial contagion and volatility, arguably the more likely causes of crises going forward.  
Useful regulations will include some prudential banking systems regulations (e.g., requiring 
certain loan-loss provisioning), but they could also be more macro-economic in nature (e.g., 
limiting exposures to certain sectors), or aimed specifically at some balance-of-payments 
objectives (e.g., restrictions or taxes imposed on short-term capital flows).  Whether these fall 
(or ought to fall) under the prudential carve-out is unclear.  Nevertheless, there might be 
circumstances when a form of carve-out will be useful, although it can be more 
circumscribed than currently formulated. 
 
In addition to assessing the scope of the prudential carve-out under GATS, it will be useful to 
complement the forthcoming round of market access commitments in GATS with a set of 
pro-competitive principles of sound regulation.  Proposals in this respect have been made by 
many in the financial services industry.  They center around commitments on improved 
transparency and regulatory reform, including transparent domestic rules and administrative 
procedures.   This emphasis on increased transparency would be consistent with the general 
need highlighted in this paper that trade liberalization needs to be complemented with a more 
active competition policy. 
 
 
6.  Areas lesser known 
 
 
Rather than present conclusions, I like to raise some areas that are less well-known.  A 
number of these will be taken up in the other parts of the volume.  I am raising them here as 
they can also have competitive impact.  One is what to do to further foreign bank entry.  If, as 
evidence suggests, entry by foreign banks can be useful, are there specific measures countries 
can put in place to attract foreign banks?  Since there is also some evidence that the size of 
banks and the nature of the home country affect the behavior of entrants, it can be suggested 
that policy makers try to affect the size and home country of foreign banks entering.   
Furthermore, since lending can been hindered by the more formal approaches used by foreign 
banks, and distance more generally creates obstacles, it is tempting to suggest using a 
different regulatory approach to foreign banks’ international operations.  This, of course, is 
quite difficult and can create uneven approaches.  This seems to deserve some further 
research.  Also, can the right type of banks—size, host, diversified⎯specifically be attracted 
at all?  And if so, are such, possible preferential treatments consistent with the WTO-
principles? In terms of the overall sequence of reforms⎯capital account liberalization, 
financial services liberalization, domestic deregulation⎯there are questions on sequence to 
be followed that maximizes the impact of foreign banks.  I am skeptical research can cast   17
much light on this in general, but nevertheless one can try to review some case studies as to 
their experiences with sequencing.  
 
A broader question is what to do in small economies.   Clearly, there are many scale issues to 
consider here beyond cross-border banking and foreign banks entry specifically.  It raises the 
“economies of scale” of an own currency, regulation and supervision, etc.  But one can try to 
address whether there are more special approaches, or sequences to be followed. There are 
experiences of countries like the Baltics that adopted at the same time currency boards, had 
large cross-border banking and harmonized rules as they got ready to enter the EU.  Perhaps 
these and other small economies experiences are relevant to review.  Furthermore, regional 
solutions and some of the arrangements in the African currency unions on common 
institutional infrastructures (stock exchanges and regulation and supervision) may be relevant 
to review. Also, might there be ways to open up particular aspects of financial services 
provision chain that are more suited to small economies? For example, in the area of banking, 
could gross value payments system be outsourced to foreign markets, while retail payments 
system are developed domestically?    Again, these are issues that could have implications for 
competition. 
 
The minimal requirements on rules and the necessary degree of harmonization of rules and 
practices are typically considered regulation and supervision issues.  Yet, there is a 
competitiveness angle to them as well.  Apart from the need to assure contestability, there 
could also be an argument to adapt rules given the special focus of foreign banks.  If indeed 
foreign banks focus more on hard-information, foreign banks may be more conservative in 
their local lending behavior in developing countries, thus potentially making less of a 
contribution.  This behavior can be part of their general practices (see de Haas and Naaborg, 
2005)⎯and should thus not be discouraged (Stein, 2002), but could in part also because they 
apply their de-facto more strict home standards (whether Basel II, AML, etc.) to their local 
lending operations.  To the extent this more formal approach creates too great a distance from 
the borrower, and undermines productive lending, should the rules consequently be adopted?  
Put differently, there may be some specific regulatory responses that increase the competitive 
impact of entry of foreign banks.  For example, whether subsidiaries or branches are allowed 
for foreign banks can perhaps consider the development and competitiveness impact.
2  More 
generally, is there an argument to avoid overregulation of foreign banks, operations and if so 
what regulatory elements specifically can be adjusted?  
 
Finally, what does the “new” view of competition policy mean for the tools for identifying 
and addressing competition issues? Clearly, the tools typically used to date are quite limited 
(Herfindahl/or concentration indexes) and need to be enhanced. Yet, the analytical tools 
developed for measuring competition in financial services industries are hard to apply 
empirically.  What to use in practice?  Related, what is the specific role of WTO/GATS and 
regional free-trade agreements (FTA) in this process?  How can GATS/FTAs help with entry 
by fostering deeper reforms? There clearly is a commitment role of GATS/FTAs in domestic 
competition, but how to implement is not as clear.  At the same time, how can one avoid the 
equivalent of trade diversion in any FTAs, given the strong home bias that already exists in 
financial services provision (e.g., regional financial institutions may dominate cross-border 
banking but this may reduce the diversification and other benefits)? 
 
                                                 
2 Cerutti, Dell'Ariccia and Martinez Peria 2005, study the differences between motives of 
foreign banks to go abroad as subsidiaries or branches.  See also Gkoutzinis, 2005.   18
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